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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LESTER E. CANNON and
MARGARET CANNON,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,
Case No.
-vsORVAL WRIGHT,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action to recover the amount due on a
promissory note, together with costs and attorney's fees
on the part of the plaintiffs and a counter-claim on the
part of the Defendent to recover the value of an air compressor.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable

A. John

1
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Ruggeri, sitting without a jury. The trial court entered a
judgement against the Plaintiffs dismissing the complaint
with prejudice, and a judgment of a like nature against
the Defendant's counter-claim. The attorney for the Defendant submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law for the courts approval which were subsequently
signed by the court. The Plaintiffs filed Objections to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions asking the court for
more specific findings and these objections were not ruled on by the court. The Plaintiffs also moved for a new
trial which later motion was overruled and denied by the
court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the Judgment againt the
Plaintiffs of the trial court reversed and remanded with
instructions to enter judgment against the Defendant
Orval Wright, for the amount due on the promissory note
and for a reasonable attorney's fees and costs,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Orval Wright had been active in the
Southern Utah area in the development and sale of subdivision properties, particularly in the Kolob area of
Washington County, Utah. Mr. Wright prevailed upon
the Plaintiffs and others to invest in a particular project
of development and sale. It eventually developed that the
United States Government was interested in aquiring part
of the particular project for an addition to the National
Park and for that purpose commenced an action in eminent domain in the U. S. District Court, Central Division
for the State of Ut'ah. The parties to that action were represented by Attorney Owen Nitz of Las Vegas, Nevada,
and also by Utah counsel. The parties were paid the original appraised value of the property by the U. S. Government and pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the
monies were paid to Mr. Nitz who was to disperse part of

2
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the funds and retain the rest in his trust account to cover
costs, etc., until the action was concluded.
On March 14, 1964, t h e Plaintiff and his wife and the
Defendant met in the office of Owen Nitz in Las Vegas,
Nevada, for the purpose of obtaining part of the money
they had received in the first payment by the U. S. Government. Each party received a specific sum, but by reason of an agreement between the Plaintiffs and Defendant, the Plaintiffs loaned the Defendant the Six Thousand
($6,000) Dollars that they were to receive. This was done
by having Mr. Nitz issue his trust account check no. 7293,
dated March 14, 1964, to Lester Cannon and Margaret
Cannon, who then in turn endorsed the check and delivered it to Orval Wright. At that same time a note was prepared, no one remembering clearly who prepared the
same, it being a printed form note modified for the purpose, but signed by Mr. Wright on the face thereof and
initialed on the back following an additional provision.
Mr. Wright, after some urging, admitted both the signing
and the initialing. The note was then delivered by Mr.
Wright to Lester Cannon who had the note in his sole
possession until the time this action was commenced. The
check for Six Thousand ($6,000) Dollars given to Orval
Wright was subsequently endorsed by Orval Wright who
received the proceeds thereof.
The note provided in the hand written portion for
payment as follows: "On the day payment is received by
the undersigned from the United States Government in
settlement of Civil Action No. C-114-63 in the United
States District Court of The State of Utah, Central Division, and undersigned does hereby assign to payees as security for this (over) note the sum of $6,000 from any settlement paid the undersigned as a result of said civil action no. C-114-63."
The testimony was to the effect that settlement was
made sometime in 1965, although the parties were somewhat vague. The note was then due and payable. It ap3
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pears from the testimony that neither party was present
at the time any final disbursements were made in the
civil action in the U. S. District Court, but rather settlement payments were made by mail or otherwise by Owen
Nitz. Plaintiff testified that he had not received payment
of the note and the Defendant admitted that he personally had not paid the note, but had not received any final
payment from Attorney Nitz.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED AS A MATTER OF
LAW AND AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE BY HOLDING THE PROMISE OF THE SIX
THOUSAND ($6,000) DOLLAR NOTE TO BE CONDITIONAL, AND IN LIMITING THE DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY TO THE MONIES FROM THE FUND WHICH
MERELY SECURED THE DEBT.
The law traditionally favors negotiability of notes,
and thus, the law favors the unconditionality of promises
in notes. When a note is primarily unconditional, clear
and explicit language is needed to make the promise conditional. This attitude towards promises serves two purposes, to prevent unnecessary litigations, and to insure
the integrity of notes which merely make reference to
the underlying transaction. This preference and purpose
is shown in C. H. Mountjoy Part Co. v. San Antonio Nat'l
Bank, 12 S. W. 2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928); Jones v.
Green, 293 S, W. 749, 173 Ark. 846 (1927); and Branch
Banking & Trust Co. v. Leggett, 116 S, E. 1, 185 N. C. 65
(1923).
The common law view is also expressed in the statutes dealing with commercial paper, 70-A-3-105 (1) (f),
UCA (1953). The statute provides that a promise is not
made conditional by the fact that it refers to any fund or
source from which reimbursement is expected. The statute continues, at 70A-3-105 (2) (b), by stating that a pro4
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mise is conditional only if the note states that it is to be
paid only out of a particular fund.
Upon examining the $6,000 note in light of the statute, the error of the trial court becomes evident. The note
begins with an unconditional promise to pay, and then
says, "
and the undersigned does hereby assign to the
payees as security for this note the sum of $6,000 from
any settlement paid to the undersigned as a result of said
civil action no. C-114-63." Two things are demonstrated:
First, t h a t there is no language that in any way limits
payment from only a particular fund; and second, that
the monies from the expected settlement was only additional security for the personal obligation of the Defendant, and as such was only a mere expected source of reimbursement for the debtor/Defendant. This clear and
unambiguous language leaves no room for speculation as
to its meaning, and there is certainly no way to interpret
the language in a way that would make the Defendant's
promise to pay conditional. However, the trial court held
that the promise was conditional, in direct contradiction
to the applicable law, as shown in language and purpose
of the commercial paper statutes.
A variety of cases restate the common law and statutory rules (further demonstrating the error of the trial
court), in cases where a source of expected reimbursement is mentioned in a promissory note. In Jones v. Green,
293 S. W. 749, 173 Ark. 846 (1927), the court found a promise to be unconditional when the note recited, "The tolls
collected under lease dated February 17, 1922 will be
credited on the face of the note until paid." It should be
noted that the language in that case was more restrictive
than on the $6,000 note in question now. In the case of
Branch Banking & Trust v. Leggett, 116 S. E. 1, 185 N. C.
65 (1923), the court found the promise of a note to be unconditional when the note made reference to a fund from
which payment was expected. The Louisiana court similarly found a promise to be unconditional in Muhoberac v.
5
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Saloon, Inc., 210 So. 2d 572 (LA. 1968). In that case, the
court said that the language of a note must say that it is
payable only out of a particular fund, or it will be held to
be merely security additional to the personal obligation
of the makers. Also see Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 of
Howard County v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. of
Memphis, Tenn., 272 S. W. 834, 169 Ark. 43 (1925), and
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Miller, 172 So. 557 (LA
1937).
Clearly the promise is unconditional, and the liability
of the Defendant is not limited by the monies of the expected fund which only secured the debt.
POINT n

THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED AS A MATTER OF
LAW AND AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, BY FINDING AN ACCORD AND SETTLEMENT
OF THE DEBT MERELY FROM THE FACT THAT THE
DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED MONIES FROM THE
FUND FROM WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD EXPECTED REIMBURSEMENT.
In the argument of Point I, it was shown that the
Trial Court errored in determining that the Defendant
was not personally liable on his unconditional promise to
pay his debt. This error in the interpretation of the commercial paper statute, 70A-3-105, UCA (1958), resulted in
a second error. The second error was in determining that
merely because the debtor/Defendant did not receive
money from the fund as he expected for reimbursement,
the Defendant's unconditional promise to pay and his underlying debt were completely extinguished. The argument of Point I clearly shows that the debtor/Defendant's
promise to pay was to exist even though the expected
source of reimbursement, which acted only as addition
security, was never received by the Defendant as he had
hoped.
Since the TWal Court's first error led to the second

6
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error, it is obvious that the entire matter can be remedied
by a finding t h a t the promise to pay in the $6,000 note is
unconditional, which in turn would lead to the correct result of the Defendant being personally liable on the debt,
and that his duty to pay would in no way be limited merely because the source of reimbursement never arose for
the Defendant. This result is especially proper, because
in the arguments that follow, it is shown that no other
theories of law, or facts of evidence, exist which would
allow the Defendant to avoid payment of the debt evidenced by the $6,000 note.
POINT i n
THE PLAINTIFF AS HOLDER OF THE NOTE, ES^
TABLISHED HIS RIGHT TO ENFORCE; PAYMENT OF
THE NOTE, AND ESTABLISHED THE LIABILITY OF
THE DEFENDANT ON THE NOTE.
The Plaintiff is a holder of the note. UCA 70A-1-201
(20), (1953) (Nevada Revised Statutes 104.1201 subsection
•20, (1973) defines a holder as one in possession of an instrument drawn, issued, or endorsed to him or his order.
Since the note is payable to the order of the Plaintiff, and
since the Plaintiff had possession of the note at all times,
the Plaintiff is a '"hol'der,?- of the note.
The Plaintiff, as a holder of the note, has the right to
enforce payment on the note; UCA, 70A-3-301 (1953),
(Nev rev stat 104.3301, (1973).
Because the Plaintiff established the signature of the
Defendant, and produced the instrument, he is entitled to
recover on the note, unless the Defendant could establish
a valid defense; UCA, 70A-3-307 (2), (1953), (Nev rev stat
104.3307 subsection 2, 1973). The Defendant did not
specifically deny his signature on the note in the pleadings, and therefore his signature is admitted, according
to the provisions of UCA, 70A-3-307 (1), (1953), (Nev rev
stat 104.3307 sub 1, 1953). Additionally, the Defendant
admitted his signature in the course of his testimony at
7
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trial.
Therefore, because signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles the holder, the Plaintiff, to recover on the note, unless the Defendant could establish a valid defense. Posession of the
note by the holder is evidence of non-payment and a presumption of non-payment. See McCary v. Crumpton, 103
So. 2d 714, 267 Ala. 484 (1958); Guerin v. Cassidy, 119 A.
, 2d 780, 38 N. J. Super. 454 (1951); Lurie v. Newhall, 76 N.
E. 2d 813, 333 111. App. 173 (1947).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT BE3CAUSE THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT
TO RECOVER ON THE NOTE WAS ESTABLISHED,
WHILE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY
EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT SATISFY HIS BURDEN OF
PROVING A VALID DEFENSE.
A. The Defendant claimed payment or satisfaction as
a defense, he therefore had the burden to prove that payment was made. UCA, 70A-3-307 (2) (1953), (Nev rev stat
104.3307 sub 2, 1973) states that when a note is produced
and the signatures are established, the Defendant is liable
unless he can establish a defense. The common law similarly is that payment is an affirmative defense, and that
the party alleging the defense has the burden of proving
payment. See Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 262, 311 P2d 788
(1957); State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82
Utah 416, 25 P2d 612 (1933); Bell v. Jones, 100 Utah 87,
110 P2d 327 (1941); and 70 C.J.S. Payment 65 (1951).
The Defendant's only evidence to support his alleged
defense of payment was that the funds from the settlement of the civil suit, which were merely collateral securing the debt, had been distributed. The distribution of
funds in itself is certainly not sufficient to constitute a
defense, especially when the obligation of the note is ex8
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amined. See Preston County Coke v. Preston County Light
& Power, 119 S. E. 2d 420, 146 W. Va. 231 (1961).
The clear language of the note states that the expected funds from the settlement were merely to secure the
debt. There is no indication that the settlement fund was
to be the sole source of payment, as the Defendant alleges.
The applicable statutes clearly provide that a promise is
not made conditional by the fact that the note refers to
any fund or source from which reimbursement is expected; UCA, 70A-3-105 (1) (f) (1953), (Nev rev stat 104.3105
sub 1 para f, 1973). The same statute continues by stating
that the promise is conditional only if the note states that
it is to be paid only out of a particular fund or source; UC
A, 70A-3-105 (2) (b) (1953), (Nev rev stat 104.3105 sub 2
para b, 1973). There is no language in the note that
would make it payable only from the settlement fund, or
in any other way conditional upon the distribution of the
settlement fund. Therefore, even though the funds are not
available to pay the note as expected, the Defendant is
still on his unconditional promise to pay the debt. There
is no basis in the Defendant's allegations that his liability
is discharged merely because the fund was distributed
which secured the debt.
The Plaintiff had no obligation to exhaust the security, or attempt to collect payment from the settlement
fund which secured the debt, before suing on the underlying obligation. UCA, 70A-9-501, (1953), (Nev rev stat
104.9501, 1973), states that when a debtor is in default,
a secured party may reduce his claim to a judgement,
foreclose, or otherwise enforce the security interest by
any available judicial procedure. The purpose of the
statute was to provide secured parties with a variety of
remedies upon default. The Plaintiff was not limited to
seek recovery only by foreclosing on the settlement fund
Which served merely as collateral. Therefore, even
though the Plaintiff did not seek recovery from the settlement fund, he is free to reduce his claim to a judgement
9
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by suing on the underlying obligation. See AM JUR 69 2d
Secured Transactions S548 (1973).
Since it is clear that distribution of the settlement
fund itself does not discharge the Defendant's liability on
the note, the only remaining allegation of payment by the
Defendant is that the settlement fund was distributed, in
part, as payment for the note. The Defendant presented
no evidence to prove the specific payment of the note,
but only testified that he assumed that the note had been
paid from the settlement fund distribution. Actually, a
variety of transactions had taken place involving the
Plaintiff and the Defendant, to which funds from the settlement were applied. When several obligations between
parties exist and one party claims that a payment was to
be applied to a particular obligation, the burden of proof
is on that party to prove the specific application of the
payment. This placement of the burden of proof is clearly established by Light v. Stevens, 159 Cal 288, 113 P. 659
(1911); State Finance Co. v. Hershel California Fruit Products Co., 8 Cal App 2d 524, 47 P2d 821 (1935); Redwine v.
Rohlff Lumber & Supply Co., 54 Wyo 253, 91 P2d 49
(1939); and C.J.S. Payment S97 (1951). Therefore, even
though the Plaintiff received part of the funds from the
settlement, the Defendant still had the burden to prove
that the funds were to be specifically applied as payment
for the note. Because the Defendant has failed to present
any evidence of the specific application of t h e settlement
fund distribution and because he admits no other payment, his defense of payment has no basis.
Additional evidence of non-payment is the fact that
the Plaintiff retained posession of the note. The obligee's
possession of the written obligation evidencing the indebtedness is evidence of non-payment and raises a presumption of non-payment. See Southward v. Foy, 65 Nev 694,
201 P2d 302 (1948); Light v. Stevens, 159 Cal 288, 113 P.
659 (1911); and 70 C.J.S. Payment SS99 (1951). Because
the Plaintiff has possessed the note at all times with no
10
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evidence of cancellation or renunciation on the face of
the instrument, the above presumption of non-payment
applies. Retention of the note by the Plaintiff is fully inconsistent with the allegations of payment as claimed by
the Defendant, and is also inconsistent with the ordinary
course of business which would require delivery or cancellation of a note upon payment.
It is obvious that the Defendant has failed to overcome the presumptions of non-payment and has failed to
present any evidence to prove or establish his alleged
payment.
B. The release signed by Margaret Cannon Sullen
was invalid as a means to discharge the Defendant's liability on the note, and in any event her interest had terminated before the release was signed.
The note was payable to Lester Cannon and Margaret
Cannon jointly, not in the alternative. UCA, 70A-3-116 (b)
(1953) (Nev rev stat 104.3116 1973), states that if an instrument is payable to two or more persons and not in
the alternative, it is payable to all of them and may be
discharged only by all of them. Therefore, the release by
Margaret C. Sullen alone could not discharge the Defendant's liability on the note.
Additionally, the statutes on discharge only allow
cancellation or renunciation by the holder of an instrument; UCA, 70A-3-605 (1973), (Nev rev stat 104.3605
1973). Since Lester Cannon had possession of the note at
all times, Margaret C. Sullen could not have been a "holder" to effectively discharge the Defendant's liability.
In any event, Margaret Cannon Sullen's interest was
terminated by a divorce property settlement prior to the
signing of the release.
Therefore, the release not only did not discharge the
Defendant's liability on the note, but also was completely
ineffective because Margaret Cannon Sullen's interest
11
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had been previously terminated.
C. The Defendant had the burden to prove his allegation of failure of consideration. As shown above, UCA,
70A-3-307 (2) (1953), (Nev rev stat 104.3307 sub 2 1973),
states that when the note is produced and signatures established, the Defendant is liable unless he can establish
a defense. In effect, there is a presumption of adequate
consideration. Evidence was presented by the Plaintiff
that the Defendant received Six Thousand ($6,000) Dollars by check from the Plaintiff, at or near the time he
signed the note for $6,000. The Defendant failed to present any evidence that there was not full consideration.
Because the burden of proof was on the Defendant, and
because he failed to offer any proof , his claimed defense
of failure of consideration is without basis.
In any event, the Defendant admitted at trial t h a t
there was consideration and withdrew the claim in favor
of a defense of payment.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff, as holder of the note, fully established
his claim in lower court by producing the note and establishing the signatures. The Defendant had the burden to
prove that he had a valid defense. However, the Defendant presented no evidence at all that would overcome
presumptions of full consideration and non-payment, or
the evidence presented by the Plaintiff.
Therefore, the trial court errored in holding that the
note was to be paid from a specific fund and by improperly placing the burden of proof on the Plaintiff to show
that there were no defenses, and by improperly finding
that the Defendant had met his burden of proof, in the
absence of any facts or evidence to support such a finding,
and contrary to the clear weight of evidence in support of
the Plaintiff.
12
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Therefore, the trial court should be reversed and
judgement for the Plaintiff granted in the amount of Six
Thousand ($6,000) Dollars on the note, plus costs and attorney fees as required in the note. In the alternative to
reversal for the Plaintiff, the case should be remanded to
the lower court for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT L. GARDNER
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Appellant

13
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